In the decade preceding the downfall of the Assad regime, Russia’s economic influence in Syria increased significantly. By providing political, and military support from September 2015 onward, Russia secured substantial leverage over Damascus and established a pronounced economic foothold, especially in the autonomous energy, extractive, and security sectors. This study bridges knowledge gaps about Russia’s economic presence in Syria during the conflict by comprehensively mapping the network of Russian economic interests, identifying key players from both countries, uncovering ultimate beneficiaries using front partners to evade public scrutiny and sanctions, and examining how ruling elites in Damascus and Moscow benefited.
Utilizing our database as a starting point, this research draws on official and unofficial sources to assess the organizational, ownership, and political ties between Russian and Syrian economic actors prior to Assad’s downfall. Data from 35 Russian companies operating in Syria, supplemented by insights from various commercial registers around the world, OSINT tools, and sanctions lists, has led to the identification of a network of 330 individuals and entities that form the basis of the analysis.
The findings highlight how a perceived economic boom in 2018–2019 following the regime’s military advances induced a spike in Russian business registrations in Syria. However, the high hopes faded over the next few years as the economy remained fragile until Assad’s overthrow in December 2024. While Russian companies had positioned themselves well for the possibility of reconstruction with Assad at the helm, their revenues before Assad’s downfall remained mostly limited to maritime shipping at the Port of Tartous and phosphate extraction and processing. Russia’s continued political support for Assad up until his demise, despite the lackluster economic benefit, highlights that Moscow’s main interest in Syria was geopolitical rather than economic to begin with.
The findings also reveal that Russia’s interests are dominated by two key Putin allies: the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Gennady Timchenko. Prigozhin, linked to the Wagner Group, exemplified the blurred lines between state and private interests in Russia and played a role in the energy and security sectors. Following Prigozhin’s death in 2023, questions arose regarding the future of his business holdings in Syria, largely owned through fronts. Timchenko plays a more critical role, with significant influence in the fields of phosphate extraction, shipping, petrochemicals, and oil, underscoring his integral position in Russia’s economic dealings in Syria.
Russian private sector actors committed multiple human rights violations, including the Wagner group’s torture and murder of a Syrian national captured on video. More subtly, Russian taxpayers have footed the bill for the military intervention—some 2 to 3 billion USD—but profits from the economic intervention accrued almost exclusively to oligarchs close to Putin. Meanwhile, Syrian citizens watched helplessly as their natural resources were signed away to outside interests by a regime desperate to stay in power at any cost.
Looking ahead, it is not clear what Syria’s foreign policies under Ahmad al-Sharaa will ultimately look like. In the first few months of his rule, the interim president tried to take a balanced position toward all major foreign players—including Russia, which experienced limited change in its military and economic presence. Despite Russia’s siding with Assad during the bloody conflict, Sharaa’s pragmatism may leave the door open for maintaining strong ties between the two countries, especially if the US refuses to engage meaningfully and remove Assad-era sanctions on the country and, ultimately, the terror listings on Sharaa and his former group.
Given Syria’s limited natural resources and the bleak outlook for reconstruction, Russia is likely to continue to be motivated more by its military interests—especially those related to naval and air bases—and its political foothold in Syria rather than by reaping fringe economic gains. At this point, however, the fate of Russia’s existing economic interests remains uncertain and will largely depend on any political settlement between Damascus and Moscow.
This report brings transparency to Russia’s shady economic dealings with the former Assad regime. Such transparency enables accountability efforts by Syrians and the international community at large, whether through litigation or sanctions. Dissecting the intricate web of economic relationships is also paramount for the Syrian government to understand the nature of these investments, hold Russian oligarchs accountable, and chart a fairer course for bilateral relations by restructuring or canceling contracts signed during Assad’s reign.
Economic contracts signed during the conflict were predatory and coercive toward the Syrian people. Both Putin and the deposed Assad regime have committed numerous violations of human rights and international law. It is now crucial to support the Syrian people under the new government in reclaiming their rightful entitlements stemming from these investments. Pressure should also be exerted on Russia to ensure the restoration of these rights. We recommend: