Syrian Mercenaries in Ukraine

Syrian Mercenaries in Ukraine

Executive Summary

Early in the Ukraine war, hundreds of Syrian soldiers, mainly from Russian-backed military units under the Assad regime, were reportedly recruited by Moscow and deployed in Ukraine. This report reveals that another recruitment pattern has emerged since late 2023: intermediaries have recruited small groups of Syrian men for service in Ukraine who do not necessarily belong to armed units, and who are not necessarily fit for combat. Three such recruitment intermediaries are profiled in this report:

 

  • Polina Azarnykh, a Russian woman who pivoted from international education to foreign mercenary recruitment during the Ukraine war. She uses Facebook and Telegram to advertise contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense in exchange for lucrative pay, passports, and citizenship. Her posts show she has facilitated the recruitment of foreign soldiers for the Ukraine war mainly from Arabic-speaking countries including Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, and Yemen, in addition to Tajikistan, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Nigeria, and elsewhere. Azarnykh was still soliciting foreign recruits as of the publication of this report.
  • Akram Deeb Tarraf, a Syrian businessman based in Russia with family ties to the now-deposed Assad regime, who acted as a facilitator and translator for Syrian recruits upon their arrival to Russia in late 2023 and early 2024.
  • Waseem al-Dimashqi, a well-known intermediary based in southern Syria who recruited at least three groups of Syrians for service in Ukraine between December 2023 and February 2024. At some point al-Dimashqi may have run afoul of Assad’s security services, as he was reportedly arrested in March 2024 on charges of forging travel documents.

 

After investigating these recruiters’ activities, interviewing two recruits, and reviewing open source reports, the research team noted the following two themes related to Syrian fighters in Ukraine since late 2023:

 

Money is the main factor driving enlistment. Syrian recruits are lured by promises of high salaries given Syria’s decimated economy1.

 

Some Syrian recruits have been duped by promises of non-combat roles, and financially exploited by intermediaries. Recruiters Akram Deeb Tarraf and Waseem al-Dimashqi reportedly told recruits their mission was to guard mines in Russia or perform similar duties, not fight in combat. These intermediaries also reportedly used their leverage to exploit recruits financially. In contrast, Polina Azarnykh is honest with prospective recruits that they are going to fight in Ukraine and advises them not to take money from other intermediaries.

 

The research team also noted the following two themes related to the recruitment of foreigners of various nationalities by Azarnykh (including but not limited to Syrians):

 

Azarnykh has steadily increased the advertised compensation over time, which could indicate growing Russian demand, or a decline in supply, for foreign soldiers as the Ukraine war progresses. For example, the signing bonus in August 2023 was equivalent to $3,160 while the salary began at $2,050. The most recent signing bonus advertised in January 2025 ranged from $8,000 to $30,000, while the salary began at $2,5002.

 

There are lax requirements for recruits, indicating quantity is valued over qualityAzarnykh has specified that middle-aged men, indigent foreign students, migrants, and men with criminal records and outstanding court cases are all eligible for service. In one post she wrote new recruits would undergo training for only 27 days before being deployed to Ukraine. In addition, one of the Syrian recruits interviewed for this report complained of middle-aged and sick men among his group of recruits. In a video Akram Tarraf filmed of new Syrian recruits, there appear to be middle-aged men among the group.

 

Existence of wider recruitment effort involving intermediaries

Since fall 2023, a series of news reports have exposed Moscow’s recruitment of men from various nationalities to fight in Ukraine, including Indians, Nepalese, Yemenis, Egyptians, Cubans, and others. Russian companies and individuals, as well as companies and individuals based in the targeted countries, have played a prominent role as intermediaries in these recruitment operations.

 

The intermediaries profiled in this report resemble those profiled elsewhere. Azarnykh’s pivot from international education to mercenary recruitment mirrors the biography of a Russian travel-agent-turned-recruiter, who was identified by TIME magazine as targeting Cuban men for service. The intermediaries Tarraf and al-Dimashqi promised recruits lucrative salaries guarding mining facilities in Russia, only for these men to be pressed into military service upon their arrival; recent reports on Yemeni recruits in Ukraine show they were deceived in a similar manner.

 

Therefore, the recruiters profiled here appear to be part of a wider Russian recruitment effort that utilizes intermediaries and targets men predominantly from the developing world. In one notable example, India’s Central Bureau of Investigation announced in May 2024 that it had “busted a major human trafficking network running across the country targeting gullible youths on the promise of offering lucrative jobs abroad,” only for the youths to be sent “against their wishes” to Ukraine3.

 

Ukrainian security sources told Forbes in May 2024 that Russia was recruiting fighters from at least 21 countries.

 

Future of Syrian recruitment for the Ukraine war

Will the fall of the Assad regime spell the end of the recruitment of Syrians for service in Ukraine? The authors of this report do not necessarily think so. On the one hand, the new Syrian administration is unlikely to greenlight the deployment of Syrian mercenaries to Ukraine, as doing so could jeopardize its push for international recognition and the lifting of western sanctions. On the other hand, some former opposition armed groups remain outside the control of the state apparatus, chief among them the brigade of Ahmed al-Awda in Dara’a, who is known for his close ties to Russia. Al-Awda’s military unit, or others outside the auspices of the state, could in theory continue to supply Russia with Syrian mercenaries—especially as Moscow retains control over the Khmeimim airbase from which previous groups of mercenaries departed Syria.


To review the full report, click here.

References:
1 This finding appears to hold true for Syrians recruited at the start of the Ukraine war as well
2 USD values were calculated based on the RUB-USD exchange rate on the date of the advertisement.
3 Central Bureau of Investigation (India), “CBI Has Arrested Four Accused in a Case Related to Trafficking of Indian Nationals for Combat Role in Russian Army”, X/Twitter post, 8 May 2024. Archived screenshot.